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I start with three stories, on the way to two histories that will introduce
an argument about increasing control over creativity in our country today.
This is not a happy tale. It's not happy for lawyers in particular. For the
story that I want to tell is the story of law captured in a way that
undermines some of its most important values and tradition: a tradition
that has supported innovation and creativity, has supported the new against
the old, but is now increasingly captured by the old to protect itself against
the new.
I. THREE STORIES
1. Everyone has heard of the Brothers Grimm. They wrote fairy tales.
If you are like I was, you probably think that they wrote wonderful and
happy fairy tales-the sort of stories children ought to be raised on. That's
a mistake. The Grimm fairy tales are, as the name suggests, quite grim:
awful, bloody, moralistic stories that should be kept far from any healthy
* Editor's Note: This is a transcript ofthe Dunwody Lecture that Professor Lessig delivered
at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law, April 26, 2002.
** Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.A./B.S., 1983, University of Pennsylvania;
M.A., 1986, Cambridge University; J.D., 1989, Yale.
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childhood. Yet you are likely to believe that these stories are wonderful
and happy, because they have been retold to us by an amazing creator
called Disney.
Walt Disney took these stories and retold them in just the way our
founders imagined that our culture would grow. He took the stories, and
retold them in a way that would speak to his time. And most important for
my purposes here, he could retell them because these stories lived in the
public domain. Their copyright protections had lapsed. And they had
lapsed because copyrights, in America at least, are for a "limited time"
only. That limitation in turn builds a kind of creative commons: a resource
from which anyone can draw and add and build upon because the
Constitution guarantees the law's protection will end.
We can think of this "creative commons," this public domain from
which others may draw, as a lawyer-free zone. No one can control what
you do with material there, meaning you need never speak to a lawyer to
draw material from there. The public domain is thus a resource that
requires the permission of no one. And it is a resource that creators
throughout history have drawn upon freely.
The significance of this resource has changed. Initially the term of
copyright was just fourteen years, and if the author lived, possibly twentyeight. In 1831, the maximum term was extended to forty-two years, and
in 1909, to a maximum of fifty-six years. But then beginning in 1962,
Congress got into a habit that it has yet to break. In that year, Congress
extended the terms of existing copyrights, as it has done eleven times in
the past forty years. At first these extensions were brief-one or two years
at the most. The most recent extension-the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act-is not. The Act extended the term of existing copyrights
by twenty years. Each of these extensions tolls the public domain. The
most recent string of extensions means that the public domain will have
been tolled for seventy percent of the past forty years.
This tolling means that material from our recent past is increasingly
unavailable for others to build upon. The history of creative work passing
into a public domain has effectively been repealed by this practice of
tolling by Congress. Something very different will now take its place.
Under the current practice, no one can do to the Disney Corporation what
Disney did to the Brothers Grimm.
2. In 1936, a one-hit author, Margaret Mitchell, wrote a book about the
South. This book, Gone With the Wind, told the story of the antebellum
South from a very distinctive perspective. This story has been quite
popular. Translated into over thirty languages, Gone With the Wind is said
to have sold more copies than any other book, save the Bible. The book
has earned the Mitchell estate millions of dollars, and it continues to be a
symbol of the South to many who would retell it.
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One woman, Alice Randall, wanted to tell that story a bit differently.
She wrote a book called The Wind Done Gone. The Wind Done Gone tells
the story of Gone With the Wind but from the perspective of the African
slaves. That perspective is quite different from Margaret Mitchell's. From
Randall's perspective, the story is not quite as heroic, not quite as
apologetic. Indeed, Alice Randall's story is a counter-story to the story
that Margaret Mitchell told.
But when Randall's publishers tried to publish this story, they received
a letter from the lawyers of the Margaret Mitchell estate. That letter
essentially said: This story is ours. We own the copyright. You need our
permission to write a derivative. We will not give you the permission to
write this derivative.
It might seem odd that the copyright of a book written in 1936
continues today. When the book was first published, the maximum term
that the law offered Mitchell was fifty-six years. Under those terms, the
copyright should have expired in 1992. But because of Congress's
addiction to extending copyright terms, the copyright now lasts until
203 1-unless of course Congress extends it again.
Because the copyright continues, the Mitchell estate believed it had the
right to control any derivative work that grew from the story. It therefore
turned to the law to exercise its control over Randall's content. The
Mitchell estate filed a lawsuit, demanding that the publication be stopped,
and just to add a little bit of dramatic flare for the copyright lawyers, that
the existing published books had to be burned. A federal judge reviewed
their claim. After a fifty-page opinion, the judge concluded thit Randall's
story had to be banned. Months later, and no doubt, thousands of dollars
in legal fees later, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
but reversed only after the full of the profit that Alice Randall ever
expected to recover from the publication of her book had been expended.
Now you might think, "How is it in the United States in 2001 that we
can imagine a federal court actually ordering books to be burned,?" but
this is just a little flare of a tradition in copyright law that has allowed
speech to be regulated through the courts. And whereas that regulation was
small and incidental when the scope of copyright was narrow, now that the
scope of copyright is as broad as it is, many people face the struggle that
Alice Randall faced. Many people have to ask the question, "Will their
publisher defend their rights to publish their book against a claim by
someone else that the story is too close to a story protected by copyright
law?"
3. Sony is in the pet business; it has created a robot dog that it calls
AIBO. The AIBO costs something like $1300. As with any dog, ownership
gives you the right to take the dog home and teach it how to behave-at
least within limits.
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One fan of the AIBO dog learned something about these limits. He
took his Sony AIBO dog apart to understand how it worked. He tinkered
with the dog. And after tinkering with the dog, he figured out how the
code instructed the dog to operate, and he wanted his dog to operate in a
somewhat different way. He wanted to teach his dog to dance jazz. On his
website, aibopet.com, this fan of the AIBO taught others how to tinker
with their pet. And one particular bit of tinkering would enable the AIBO
dog to dance jazz.
It is not a crime in the United States to dance jazz. Indeed, in most
jurisdictions, it is a completely permissible activity. But when the owner
of aibopet.com posted this little hack on his website, he got a letter from
the Sony Corporation: "Your site contains information providing the
means to circumvent AIBO ware's copy protection protocol constituting
a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of a law called the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act."
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was Congress's effort
to give copyright owners one more tool to protect copyrighted material.
Copyright law is the first tool. Many copyright owners have now turned
to technology as a second. This technology protects copyrighted material
from unauthorized use. And this law-the DMCA-protects that
technology from unauthorized circumvention. Thus the law (the DMCA)
protects the code (the copyright protection technology) and the code
protects the law (the copyright).
But the DMCA does not just protect code that protects copyright
interests. Instead, the DMCA protects much more. It is impermissible
under the DMCA to circumvent a copyright protection system, even if the
circumvention itself enables a use of copyrighted material that would be
completely permissible under copyright law.
For example, fair use: If a technology locks up copyrighted content
such that a "fair use" is not possible, and a company produces a tool to
enable the circumvention of that technology to enable that "fair use," the
company has, "fair use" notwithstanding, broken the law.
And thus the trouble the AIBO fan caused: Though teaching your dog
to dance jazz is certainly a fair use of your dog---even your robot
dog-distributing code to enable this fair use is prohibited. Fair use
remains free in law only if it remains free from technology.
11. TWO HISTORIES

There is a common phenomenon in constitutional law that we can call
inversion, or more precisely, technological inversion. Technological
inversion happens when a set of values originally protected by the
Constitution get flipped because the technology embedding those values
changes. The world becomes the opposite of what it was, not because
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politicians have changed the law or the Constitution, but because
technologies have changed the interpreted context.
This inversion is noted, and complained about, by both liberals and
conservatives alike. Liberals typically complain in the context of the
Fourth Amendment: the Constitution says that persons, houses, papers,
and affects are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
context in which this text was written, the assumption was that invasions
on what we would call people's privacy would primarily be affected
through a trespass on someone's property. Trespass, then, was a law
presupposed in the background that protected people against the invasions
of private and public actors. The Fourth Amendment guaranteed that, at
least with respect to federal actors, that background law could not be
compromised, except where there was good reason.
In the last war on drugs in the United States, prohibition, this value was
challenged. It was challenged because technologies constructed a way to
invade other people's privacy without violating the laws of trespass. This
technology was wiretapping. Wiretapping technology made it possible for
the state to listen to the private conversations of people in their homes,
without actually going into their homes, and so the Supreme Court in
1928, was confronted in a case called Olmstead with the question, "Does
this text protect people against invasions by the state through technologies
such as wiretapping?" In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Taft said, "No."
The Supreme Court said the Fourth Amendment protected against
trespasses; trespassing was not at stake in wiretapping; therefore, the
Fourth Amendment could not protect against wiretapping.
Justice Brandeis dissented. And his dissent articulated the idea of
technological inversion. According to Justice Brandeis, unrestricted
wiretapping makes no sense of the values that the framers imbedded. They
wrote against one technological background. That technological
background has flipped. We should update their protection, Brandeis
argued, to take into account the new technology. We should update it, not
to change the value the Constitution protected, but instead to assure that
the same value the Constitution protected is still protected. Without such
a change, Brandeis said, we had this world where much was private and
a little chunk was public. With this change, that world was now inverted.
Most things private could now be public because of this trick of
technology. The private is in turn reduced.
Conservatives have a parallel complaint about technological inversion.
The Constitution says that Congress has the power to regulate commerce
among the several states. When this text was written, interstate commerce
was relatively thin. It thus followed that the capacity of the federal
government to regulate interstate commerce was relatively thin. But as
technology has changed, interstate commerce has increased. Railroads,
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computers, refrigeration cars, highways-all of these technologies have
radically expanded the scope of commerce properly called "interstate."
As interstate commerce increases, the plausible scope of "commerce"
among the several states increases as Well. And thus, while in the framing
context, when most activity was state activity, untouchable by the federal
government, as more commerce becomes interstate, more activity is in
principle reachable by that federal commerce power. This in turn shifts the
balance of power away from the states to the federal government. And it
is this change in turn that troubles the conservatives.
For, as they argue, echoing Brandeis, this change in constitutional
values was not ratified by any constitutional amendment. It is instead
solely the product of different technology. Thus, the aim of the
conservatives is to find a way to read the constitution to protect these
framing values. We should not, they say, let this technological
transformation undermine the original values of federalism. We should
instead protect these federalist values against unintended transformations
caused by technology.
In both cases, it is the same change that is remarked upon by liberals
and conservatives alike. Technology changes; that change inverts framing
constitutional values. In both cases, these inversions produce a common
response. At first, the response is blinders. In both cases, the Court at first
ignores the technological change and continues to apply the text just as it
always was applied. But after a time, the Supreme Court begins to account
for the effect of this technological change, by rebalancing the original
practice with one that better preserves original values in a new context. In
both cases, initial blinding is replaced by balancing.
III. ONE ARGUMENT

Copyright law is suffering a technological inversion. Copyright law
initially imbeds a set of values. The technology within which this law
lived has changed. My claim is that change in technology has now inverted
those original values.
These values originally protected the public domain. They enabled a
vibrant cultural commons. Yet changing technology and changing law is
increasingly enclosing that commons. Tools built into the architecture of
cyberspace are defeating a tradition of balanced freedom that defined our
past. Yet the law has not yet recognized this inversion. We are still in the
stage of blinders. Courts and legislators proceed as if everything is the
same, while in fact, crucial original values are inverted.
The Framers granted authors a very limited set of rights. The first
Copyright Act covered just maps, charts, and books. It gave authors an
exclusive right over printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending only.
Works were protected forjust fourteen years, renewable once, if the author
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was alive when the first term expired. And works were only protected if
they were registered, if the author deposited copies with an appropriate
depository, and if the author was American. Our outrage at China
notwithstanding, we should not forget that until 1891, American copyright
law did not protect foreign copyrights. We were born a pirate nation.
In the first ten years of this copyright regime, there were some 13,000
titles that were published. Yet there were less than 1,000 copyright
registrations. The aim of the original copyright regulation was to control
publishers. In 1790, there were 127 publishers. This law was a tiny
regulation of a tiny part of early American culture.
Most culture thus remained free of any copyright regulation. You could
take a book and write an abridgement without any regulation of copyright
law. You could translate the book without any regulation of copyright law.
You could take the book and turn it into a play without any regulation of
copyright law. You could physically write out every word in that book and
give it to your friends without any regulation of copyright law. The culture
was free in a sense that is increasingly being demanded in debates about
culture today: there was a freedom to Disnify culture, as Disney did to the
Brothers Grimm; a freedom to tell counter-stories as Alice Randall did;
and a freedom to tinker with the content that one finds without fear of
committing a federal crime, as the fans of the AIBO wanted.
We could say, following a recent Apple ad campaign, that in our past,
there was a freedom to "Rip, Mix, and Bum" culture. Regulation protected
against unfair competition, but that regulation left people to develop their
culture as they wished.
That past has now changed. It first changed because the law has
changed. We've moved from the protection of maps, charts, and books to
protecting essentially any creative work reduced to a tangible form. We no
longer grant an exclusive right covering just printing, reprinting,
publishing, or vending; because of an unfortunate transformation in the
1909 statute, the law now covers any "copy"-which means turn on your
computer and you've engaged the jurisdiction of copyright. We have
abandoned the requirement that a work is protected only if registered and
adopted a rule that protects work whether registered or not. We have
moved from a world that says only if you have deposited the work will
you get any protection to a world where you get protection whether you
deposit or not. Copyright law now protects automatically regardless of the
will of any creator.
More important than these changes in law are the changes effected by
technology. Think about the life of a book. I can take a book and I can sell
it to my friend, I can give it away, I can bum it, I can take a chapter and
Xerox it, I can read it aloud, I can sleep on it: I can do all of these things
because the technology of a book is crude. The publisher can't control
what I do with a printed book because there is no way to control pages
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separated from the publisher. And not only can they not control what I do
physically with the book, the law, copyright law, affirmatively limits the
ability of the publisher to do anything to the book, once the book is sold.
But compare then a book in cyberspace. I have a number of books in
my Adobe eBook Reader. One is Middlemarch-a work that is in the
public domain. Even though this uncopyrighted book is in some senses
free, it's not free in the Adobe eBook Reader. The publishers of this eBook
have set the permissions on the reader to control what I can do with the
book. Permission is granted to me to read this book aloud using a
technology to read Middlemarch aloud. The permissions also say I may
copy ten text sections into the computer's clipboard memory every ten
days. They allow me to print ten pages everyday using my computer. And
here is the most embarrassing example: my most recent book, The Future
ofIdeas. My publisher released it stating I'm not allowed to copy any text
sections into the memory, I'm not allowed to print any pages, and don't try
to use your computer to read my book aloud, it's an offense of copyright
law. Freedoms I would have with a real book get erased when this book is
made virtual.
Now what makes these protections possible? In part what makes it
possible is just the code built into the Adobe eBook Reader. The
technology gives the publisher a control over an eBook that no publisher
could ever have had over a regular book. And because of this control, the
use of an eBook is regulated, as opposed to the original vision of copyright
where it wasn't the use that was regulated, as Ray Patterson has reminded
us over and over again since his extraordinary book in 1968, but the
publishing of copyrighted works by commercial entities.
Technology is thus both increasing copyright's reach, and, because of
the scope of copyright regulation, its significance as well. The reach of
copyright is expanded by technology, both directly and indirectly.
Indirectly, since every copy of a copyrighted work is potentially within the
reach of the copyright act, and every act on a digital network produces a
copy. Directly, in that the technology enables a control over these copies
that before would have been impossible. In real space, reading a book was
not a regulated act, since reading a book did not produce a copy. But in
cyberspace, reading a book both produces a copy, and can be controlled
by the technology that makes that copy.
The significance of copyright's regulation is far greater than the
framers of copyright imagined, but it's not just over original works that we
should be concerned. Here's the second example, Microsoft's vision of
movie making. The greatest change that the Internet and digital
technologies would enable is the expansion of the range of creators, people
who can use media to create and express their ideas. Now it turns out, not
surprisingly once you think about it, that the ability to create is increasing,
as the opportunity for broad-based creativity is expanded by digital
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technology. To make movies is a skill, it must be taught. And in south
L.A., USC has launched a program to go into schools and teach kids how
to make film. They give them digital technologies, they give them a library
of existing content, they give them cameras, and they force them into this
process of learning how to express themselves using images. The logic of
expressing yourself with images is different from words. You can't qualify
everything you say with digital images; the person's either in the screen
shot or not. There's a logic and power and order that becomes
extraordinarily hard to manipulate, but becomes a form of expression. It
turns out, those who write well don't necessarily direct well, and those
who direct well turn out to have skills that can be translated into this
modem economy in a way that is extraordinarily valuable to them.
In the first years of this program, the teachers were astonished at the
quality of films that these children were able to produce, and they decided
they wanted to make these films available to others. They had little
snippets of other films in them or a little music integrated into these films.
But of course, as they were quickly reminded by the university's counsel,
there would be no way to make these works available to anyone else.
Why? Because to make these works available requires the permission of
the copyright owners of these other films or music, and these permissions
could not practically be secured.
I was recently told of an example of this by a documentary filmmaker
who was making a film about education. Jon Else was shooting across a
classroom and he captured inadvertently the image of a television. On the
screen you could barely make out an episode of the Simpsons.
Else knows Matt Groening, the creator of the Simpsons. He called Matt
Groening to ask permission. Groening referred him up the permission
chain, and eventually he was referred to a lawyer. To use the three seconds
in the background, Else was told he would have to pay $10,000.
These controls make little sense when applied to commercial creators.
They make no sense when they restrict the ability of schools to post films
their students have made, or the ability of independent directors to make
their films available on the Internet. The rules that govern this space were
written for the large companies that control this space; they make no sense
when applied to the large number of new creators this space enables.
These controls increasingly mean that the ability to take what defines
our culture and include it in an expression about our culture is permitted
only with a license from the content owner. Free culture is thus
transformed into licensed culture. The freedom to remake and retell our
culture thus increasingly depends upon the permission of someone else.
The freedom to Disnify is undermined. The freedom to counter-tell stories
is weakened. The freedom to tinker, especially for the technologist to
tinker, is threatened.
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This change in turn is the product of a change in how the law responds
to changes in technology. Technology has been changing the way content
is distributed since the birth of the printing press. In the United States, the
law has been responding to changes in the technology of distribution since
the turn of the last century. But until the Internet, the law's response to this
change has been consistent and appropriately conservative.
Consider the example of "piano rolls." In the early 1870s, Henri
Fourneuaux invented the player piano, which recorded music on a punch
tape as a pianist played the music. The result was a high-quality copy
(relative to the poor quality of phonograph recordings at the time) of
music, which could then be copied and played any number of times on
other machines. By 1902, there were approximately seventy-five thousand
player pianos in the United States, and about one million piano rolls had
been sold.
Authors of sheet music complained that their content had been
"stolen"-or, we might say, "Napsterized." But the Supreme Court
disagreed. Though the content the piano player played was taken from
sheet music, it was not, the Court held, a "copy" of the music that it, well,
copied. Piano roll manufacturers (and record companies, too) were
therefore free to "steal" the content of the sheet music to make money with
their new inventions.
Congress responded quickly to the Court's decision by changing the
law. But the change did not give copyright holders perfect control over
their copyrighted material. In granting authors a "mechanical reproduction
right," Congress gave authors the exclusive right to decide whether and on
what terms a recording of their music could be made. But once a recording
had been made, others had the right (upon paying two cents per copy) to
make subsequent recordings of the same music-whether or not the
original author granted permission. The effect of this compromise, though
limiting the rights of original authors, is to expand the creative opportunity
of others. New performers had the right to break into the market, by taking
music made famous by others and rerecording it, after the payment of a
small compulsory fee.
The same story marked the birth of cable TV. Cable TV was born by
stealing the content of others and reselling that content to consumers.
Suppliers of cable services would set up an antenna, capture the
commercial broadcasts made by television stations, and then resell those
broadcasts to their customers. The copyright holders did not like this
"theft." Twice they asked the Supreme Court to shut it down. Twice the
Court said no. Again it fell to Congress to strike a balance between cable
TV and copyright holders. And Congress again followed the model set by
player pianos: cable TV had to pay for the content it broadcast, but the
content holders did not have an absolute right to grant or deny the right to
broadcast its content. Instead, cable TV got a compulsory licensing system
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to guarantee that cable operators would be able to get permission to
broadcast content at a relatively modest level. Thus content holders, or
broadcasters, could not leverage their power in the television broadcasting
market into power in the cable services market. Innovation in the latter
field was protected from power in the former.
In the very same year that this balance was struck, 1976, Universal and
Disney filed a lawsuit against yet another technology that enabled people
to use content in a way the copyright owner could not control. This was
the VCR-said by Jack Valenti, the head of the Motion Pictures
Association of America (MPAA), to be the Boston Strangler of the
American film industry. Worse, it was a JapaneseBoston Strangler of the
American film industry. This technology would Napsterize American film,
these companies complained, and thus they asked the Supreme Court to
stop this Napsterization. Eight years later, the Supreme Court again said
no. More significantly, and for the first time, the Court articulated a
fundamental "separation of powers" reason why the answer was no. As the
Court explained, when major technological changes change the way in
which copyrighted material gets distributed, it is not the Court's job to
restrike a balance between copyright owners and the public. The only
question the Court should ask is whether there is a "potential for a
substantial noninfringing use" of the technology. If it can be used for
good, then the Court would not even consider all the ways in which it can
be used for bad. So long as it has a good use, the bad uses are for Congress
to worry about.
This principle explains the Court's treatment of the VCR, cable TV,
and piano rolls. The pattern says fit the law to the new technology, so that
the new technology can flourish. Adjust the law to the new ways in which
content gets distributed so that content gets distributed in its most efficient,
productive, innovative way, and let Congress later assure that content
owners get paid for their product.
That was the past. But that pattern has been changed in the last five
years. Now we require, through legislative and judicial action, that
technology fit itself to the last generation's law. Now we increasingly
require that these new innovators fit their technology to how last century's
business model worked for content.
Here are two examples. You've heard of the Napster case. It is an
unfortunate context within which to consider these issues, because you are
likely to think that the only issue Napster raises is whether your kids get
to get Britney Spears' music for free. Were that the only issue Napster
raised, then I would be on the side of the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA). But that's not at all what was at stake in the Napster
case.
The issue in the Napster case was whether the rule of the past that I just
described would remain the rule that would guide innovation. Whether
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technology advances and then law balances copyright, or whether the law
stops the technology from advancing, in the name of current owners of
copyright.
After the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against Napster, the case
went back down to Judge Patel to determine how Napster would comply
with the injunction. Napster came back to Judge Patel and said, "we have
a technology to guarantee that 98% of the exchanges across our network
comply with the copyright law. It's almost impossible for us to guarantee
100% because we can only track this on the basis of titles of files, and
once we block a certain title, then people just rename the title. But we are
willing to work to guarantee 98% compliance." Judge Patel said 98% was
not good enough. Napster would only be allowed to turn their system on
when they could guarantee 100% compliance with copyright laws.
What if the Xerox Corporation would have been told that they could
only release the Xerox machine when they could guarantee that 100% of
the copies made on their Xeroxes were compliant with copyright
regulation? There would have been no Xerox. What if manufacturers of
the VCR had been told that they could only release the VCR when 100%
of the copies made on that device were compliant with copyright
regulation? There would have been no VCR. There would have been no
cable television, there would have been no piano roll technology, there
would have been none of these new technologies if each new technology
had to assure the law that it would fit last generation's business model
perfectly.
Here's another example. One of the most extraordinary innovations
that the Internet enabled was something called "net radio." With net radio,
one could stream radio content across the Internet and thereby make the
audience as big as the Internet. This was extremely valuable for niche
radio stations-classical music stations, or alternative music
stations-where the audience in any particular geographic region is
relatively small. Once a station could reach the whole Internet, then the
audience is large enough to support niche radio.
But radio, of course, distributes copyrighted material, and there was an
inevitable concern about copyright. Congress took up this inevitable
concern and established a regime to decide how much net radio would
have to pay to distribute copyrighted material. This regime was an
arbitration process that would set the rate for net radio.
After many months of process, the arbitration panel decided. And not
surprisingly (for the pessimists at least) they decided on a regime that
would effectively end net radio. The panel chose a price that made net
radio too costly. And more significantly, they imposed a data collection
burden on net radio that would bury any net radio provider.'
1. The net radio station was required to collect the following data: The name of the service;
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So why did this panel impose these requirements? Well, the panel was
selecting a position between the two sides. One side was the RIAA. The
aim of the RIAA was clear. In testimony during the hearings, one of the
economic experts hired by the RIAA confessed that their aim was to
reduce the number of net radio stations to just a few. Their aim, in other
words, was to recreate the concentrated market for distribution that
defined the old world. But now it is not the economics of the old world
pushing us to that concentrated, segmented, easily controlled market. It is
instead restraints imposed by law. And these restraints were being used to
protect the old against the new. The law was being used to protect the past
against the future. This is dinosaurs controlling evolution.
Why is this happening? Well there is a boring story about the
corruption ofthe political process. I don't want to talk about that story. For
there is a much more invidious and important reason that explains this
fundamental change. This has to do with an ambiguity around the word
"property."
We are lawyers. As lawyers, we are licensed to use this word
"property." After three years of law school and passing a bar exam, we get
to call ourselves "lawyers." And as lawyers, we have learned certain truths
about "property." We know that property is a bundle of rights; these rights
are constantly balanced against public interest concerns; they are
architected to assure that balance. We understand that your property right
to your house is limited by easements and access requirements; we
understand that your property right in a copyright is limited by fair use,
and, in theory, for "limited times."
But what we lawyers forget is that ordinary people think about
"property" differently. They are not inculcated in the way that we are.
They have a much simpler conception of property. "Property," ordinary
people think, is "absolute and mine forever." If you say to ordinary people,
"What do you think of the idea of fair use of your property, or only having
your property for limited times?," they are likely to think, "Well, that's
weird. You don't have a fair use right to my car, nor are you able to say
after a limited time the state can come in and take away my house."

the channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station identification); the type of program
(Archived/Looped/Live); date of transmission; time of transmission; time zone of origination of
Transmission; numeric designation of the place ofthe sound recording within the program; duration
of transmission (to nearest second); sound recording title; the ISRC code of the recording; the
release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release
year of the album and copyright date of the track; featured recording artist; retail album title; the
recording Label; the UPC code of the retail album; the catalog number; the copyright owner
information; the musical genre of the channel or program (station format); the name of the service
or entity; the channel or program; the date and time that the user logged in (the user's time zone);
the date and time that the user logged out (the user's time zone); the time zone where the signal was

received (user); Unique User identifier; the country in which the user received the transmissions.
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That's what "property" means to ordinary people. So when we lawyers
speak of "intellectual property," it is extremely easy for Jack Valenti-types
to get ordinary people to think that the rights one should have in
"intellectual property" should be the same as one has for "ordinary
property." There's no difference, Valenti argues, between the absolute,
perfect, and perpetual control the law gives you over a car, and the
absolute, perfect, and perpetual control that Disney deserves for Mickey
Mouse. There thus emerges an equivalence in our culture between
"property" and "intellectual property" because we are a property-loving
nation.
But it is obvious that our tradition has always treated these two forms
of "property" differently. The same Constitution that says if the state takes
away your house, it must pay you compensation, also says if the federal
government gives you a copyright, it must, after a "limited time," take that
right away from you and give it to the public. That requirement is built
into the very text of the Constitution, revealing that from the founding we
have understood this kind of "property" to be very different from the way
Valenti understands it.
"Property talk" confuses this debate. In the current political context, to
question extremes within intellectual property is to open yourself up to the
charge of being a communist. I've been so charged more times than I can
count. But this simplistic binary thinking has no connection to our
tradition. Our tradition has always recognized a difference, and always
understood the importance of avoiding extremism in intellectual property.
Yet we have forgotten this tradition today. And instead, the expansion of
this property is an expansion in the power of the past to control our future.
This control is our modern structure of regulation. It affects how
culture develops in a way that is inconsistent with our past. And we who
believe in our tradition have an obligation to do something to recreate this
sense of balance. This is our job. We have an obligation to teach the world
something that the modern rhetoric has confused: that innovation and
creativity always exist in a context of balance. That there are private
homes and public roads. Private yards as well as city parks. We have
controlled spaces and a common space. These resources coexist; and it's
that mixture that is the surprising inspiration for innovation and creativity.
Much more than the extremism of total state control and extremism of
total propriety control, our tradition protects both together: the freedom to
code, to tinker with this reality, the freedom to speak in a way that is
consistent with the ideals of the past, the freedom to build culture without
the permission of the culture owners.
We lawyers are in part responsible for this change in understanding.
We are the agents of those who work to effect change in the legal system.
And we do it unapologetically because we work for our clients.
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But we are also a profession. We don't just work for clients. We speak
for a tradition that's richer than our clients: not richer in money, but richer
in values. When our profession becomes tied to a single perspective,
however legitimate, we lose the credibility to carry on the tradition that,
in my view, is as important as any tradition of freedom in our history. We
lawyers speak for a past that knew what free culture was. Not the tradition
that celebrated the power to steal Britney Spears' music, but the ability of
people to build on the past without apology. This is who we are. And to
the extent that we allow the world to believe that we are bought, as many
believe that Congress is bought, our authority as articulators of this most
important principle of freedom will be corrupted.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/1

16

